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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). By Order dated 
August 26,2002, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for disposition. 
The appeal herein was timely filed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Appellant was required to arrange for the appointment 
of a personal representative for a deceased defendant prior to moving for 
substitution of proper parties under Utah R. Civ. P. 25. 
Standard of Review: The granting of a motion to dismiss a complaint based 
upon a party's failure to make a motion for substitution in a timely fashion under 
Rule 25 is a question of law subject to review for correctness. Stoddard v. Smith, 
27 P.3d 546 (Utah 2001). 
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing this 
case with prejudice. 
Standard of Review: The dismissal of a case with prejudice is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Bd. Of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 
1101,1104-1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
1 
APPLICABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE 
The Court's analysis of Utah R. Civ. P. 25 will be dispositive of the 
resolution of this case on appeal: 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 25. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES 
(a) Death. 
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court 
may order substitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be 
made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 
ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement 
of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action 
shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. 
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of one or 
more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to be enforced 
survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving defendants, 
the action does not abate. The death shall be suggested upon the record and the 
action shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving parties. 
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APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Utah statutes which may be of assistance to the Court in deciding this appeal 
are as follows: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-103. Share of heirs other than surviving spouse. 
(1) Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving 
spouse under Section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving 
spouse, passes in the following order to the individuals designated below who 
survive the decedent: 
(a) to the decedent's descendants per capita at each generation as defined in 
Subsection 75-2-106(2); 
(b) if there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally if 
both survive, or to the surviving parent; 
(c) if there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the 
decedent's parents or either of them per capita at each generation as defined in 
Subsection 75-2-106(3); 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-106 (1998). Definitions--Per capita at each 
generation-Terms in governing instruments. 
(3)(a) If, under Subsection 75-2-103(l)(c) or (d), a decedent's intestate estate 
or a part thereof passes "per capita at each generation" to the descendants of the 
decedent's deceased parents or either of them or to the descendants of the 
decedent's deceased paternal or maternal grandparents or either of them, the estate 
or part thereof is divided into as many equal shares as there are: 
(i) surviving descendants in the generation nearest the deceased parents or 
either of them, or the deceased grandparents or either of them, that contains one or 
more surviving descendants; and 
(ii) deceased descendants in the same generation who left surviving 
descendants, if any. 
(b) Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is allocated one 
share. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-104 (1975). Claims against decedent-Necessity of 
Administration. 
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his 
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal 
representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all proceedings and 
actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed by the procedure 
prescribed by this chapter 3. After distribution a creditor whose claim has not been 
barred may recover from the distributees as provided in section 75-3-1004 or from 
a former personal representative individually liable as provided in section 
75-3-1005. This section has no application to a proceeding by a secured creditor of 
the decedent to enforce his right to his security except as to any deficiency 
judgment which might be sought therein. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12(l)(a) (1991). Survival of action for injury to person 
or death upon death of wrongdoer or injured person—Exception and restriction to 
out-of-pocket expenses. 
(l)(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the death of 
the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person or the personal 
5 
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a cause of action against the 
wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general 
damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action brought by the Plaintiff Wayne J. Soules 
against the Defendant Dale H. Curtis. Before the case could be tried in the District 
Court, the Defendant Curtis passed away and, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 25, the 
Plaintiff timely moved the court to substitute other parties for the deceased 
defendant prior to the expiration of 90 days from the date death was suggested on 
the record by the Defendant's counsel. The District Court granted the Defendant's 
Motion to Strike the Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Decedent's heirs as parties 
upon the ground that the Decedent's heirs were not the Defendant's personal 
representative, and that the Plaintiffs Motion failed to contain a notice of hearing. 
Subsequently, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss this case, and the District 
Court granted that motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. This appeal 
followed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Defendant herein, Dale H. Curtis, passed away on June 20, 
2001, and on December 10,2001, a Notice of Suggestion of Death was duly filed 
with the District Court by his counsel. (R. at 35; Aplt. Addend, at 1) 
2. Counsel for the Plaintiff independently established the date of the 
Defendant's death as June 20,2001, and obtained the names of each of the 
Defendant's surviving siblings by reviewing the Defendant's obituary published in 
the Salt Lake Tribune on June 24,2001. (R. at 72; Aplt. Append, at 9) 
3. Within 90 days of December 10,2001, the Plaintiff filed with the 
District Court a Motion to Substitute Proper Parties for Deceased Defendant. (R. 
at 65; Aplt. Append, at 2) 
4. Counsel for the Plaintiff served each of the Deceased Defendant's 
heirs with Notice of the Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Proper Parties for 
Deceased Defendant, allowing those parties a period of 14 days within which to 
interpose any objection to the Plaintiffs motion. (R. at 75, 78, 85, 118; Aplt. 
Append, at 12,15,22, 51) None of the Defendant's heirs at any time objected to 
the Plaintiffs motion. (Entire Record) 
5. Counsel for the deceased Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the 
Plaintiffs motion for substitution of party on March 5,2002, upon the ground that 
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no personal representative had yet been appointed for the estate; that the heirs were 
not proper parties herein; and that no notice of hearing on the Plaintiffs motion. 
(R. at 92,94; Aplt. Append, at 29, 31) 
6. Over the Plaintiffs objection, the District Court dismissed this case 
with prejudice on June 12,2002. (R. at 150; Aplt. Append, at 69) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
STRIKING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SUBSTITUTE PROPER PARTIES 
BECAUSE NO PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN 
APPOINTED FOR THE DECEASED 
DEFENDANT AND BECAUSE NO 
NOTICE OF HEARING WAS PROVIDED 
TO THE HEIRS WITH THE NOTICE OF 
INTENT TO SUBSTITUTE THEM AS 
PARTIES. 
Neither Utah R. Civ. P. 25, nor any applicable statute, requires that a 
personal representative be appointed for an estate prior to filing a motion 
under Rule 25 to substitute proper parties for a deceased defendant. Any such 
requirement is hypertechnical and does not comport with the procedure outlined in 
Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546 (Utah 2001). Further, while it is true that the 
Plaintiff did not set a hearing on his motion to substitute proper parties, and thus 
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Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546 (Utah 2001). Further, while it is true that the 
Plaintiff did not set a hearing on his motion to substitute proper parties, and thus 
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did not give notice of any such hearing to the heirs, Rule 25 should not be read to 
permit dismissal of the case in these circumstances. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN DETERMINING TO DISMISS 
THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE. 
The District Court erred in failing to consider the totality of the 
circumstances in dismissing this case with prejudice; had it done so, it should have 
determined that an injustice would result if the case was dismissed with prejudice. 
Consequently, assuming it was proper to dismiss the case at all, the Court abused 
its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
STRIKING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO SUBSTITUTE PROPER PARTIES 
BECAUSE NO PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE HAD BEEN 
APPOINTED FOR THE DECEASED 
DEFENDANT AND BECAUSE NO 
NOTICE OF HEARING WAS PROVIDED 
TO THE HEIRS WITH THE NOTICE OF 
INTENT TO SUBSTITUTE THEM AS 
PARTIES. 
The District Court determined, in effect, that, because no personal 
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representative was appointed for the decedent's estate prior to the timely filing of a 
motion to substitute proper parties under Rule 25, no proper parties were brought 
before the Court and thus this case should be dismissed. Such a reading of Rule 25 
and the applicable statutes is unduly harsh and not in accord with the analysis of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Stoddard v. Smith, 27 P.3d 546 (Utah 2001). There, the 
Court first expressed its concern that the failure of the decedent's counsel to 
identify a person who may be substituted as a proper party "would open the door to 
a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden of locating the 
representative of the estate within 90 days," id. at 550, citing Rend v. Kay, 415 
F.2d 983,986 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The Court rejected the view of federal courts 
holding that identification by the decedent's counsel of a person who may be 
substituted is implicitly required by Rule 26. Significantly, however, the court also 
expressly rejected any requirement that the party seeking substitution actually 
know the identity of the person to be substituted when filing the motion: 
However, with or without notice of the appropriate substitute, our 
holding does not unduly burden the party filing the motion for 
substitution. Under our interpretation of our rule 25, a party filing a 
motion for substitution does not have to know the identity of the 
person who may be substituted when filing the motion. A party, such 
as plaintiff in this case, may simply file a motion seeking to substitute 
the "Personal Representative of the Estate of the Decedent" or 
"John/Jane Doe." Once the motion is made, the proper person to be 
substituted for the decedent may be ascertained in due course, by 
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discovery if necessary. Consequently, there is no concern that a 
failure to identify, in the suggestion of death, a person who may be 
substituted for the deceased party, will result in "tactical 
maneuver [ing]. 
Mat 551. 
Thus, the dismissal of this case by the District Court permitted the very evil 
the Supreme Court sought to address in Stoddard, by placing the burden upon the 
Plaintiff of "locating the representative of the estate within 90 days." Under 
Stoddard, it is only the timely filing of the motion for substitution that matters; 
indeed, it is unnecessary even to know the names of the persons who might be 
properly jointed as parties. The effect of Stoddard is to allow all such issues as the 
name of an appropriate personal representative and the timing the appointment to 
be addressed after the timely filing of the motion for substitution. The Stoddard 
plaintiff did not prevail in that case solely because he failed to file his motion for 
substitution in a timely fashion; here, however, all parties in the instant case agree 
that the Plaintiffs motion was timely filed. 
Nor does the Utah Supreme Court in Stoddard impose any requirement that 
the plaintiff assume the burden of arranging for the appointment of an appropriate 
personal representative within 90 days. To the contrary, the Court only required 
that the motion seek to substitute the unnamed personal representative or 
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"John/Jane Doe." Here, the Plaintiffs motion went much further, and ascertained 
the names of all of the decedent's heirs at law, serving them with a copy of his 
notice to substitute them as parties so that one or all of them could subsequently be 
named as personal representatives, following the rule outlined in Stoddard. 
Inexplicably, however, the District Court concluded, in effect, that it was the 
Plaintiffs burden to arrange for the appointment of a personal representative, then 
seek to join that specific individual in the instant case, all within the applicable 90 
day period set forth in Rule 25. Yet nothing in the rule itself or any applicable 
statute requires any such result. 
In the Court below, the Defendant relied upon UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-104 
for the proposition that "[n]o proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a 
decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment 
of a personal representative." The cited statute, however, is inapplicable to this 
case. First, there is no claim to "revive" or "commence." The claim of an injured 
party is not extinguished merely by the death of the tortfeasor; rather, it expressly 
survives the death of the wrongful party. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12(1 )(a) 
provides that such causes of action "do not abate upon the death of the 
wrongdoer." (Emphasis added.) The same statute goes on to provide that the 
injured party has "a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
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representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages ...". Thus, 
while it is clear that, at some point, a personal representative must be named and 
must appear as the substituted party, the Utah probate code does not require that 
this occur prior to the filing of a motion to substitute proper parties after a 
suggestion of death. The District Court's holding to the contrary should be 
reversed. 
Additionally, however, the District Court also determined that the Plaintiffs 
failure to include a notice of hearing with his Notice of Plaintiff s Motion to 
Substitute Proper Parties was also fatal to his claims. (R. at 129; Aplt. Append, at 
54) On the notice issue, Rule 25 provides that "[t]he motion for substitution may 
be made by any party or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided 
in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons." However, at the time notice of the Plaintiffs motion was 
served on the heirs at law, no hearing had been scheduled on the motion; 
consequently, it was not at that time possible to provide the heirs with any notice of 
the non-existent hearing. Rule 25 should not be read so inflexibly as to require that 
a hearing on the motion for substitution must be scheduled prior to giving the heirs 
notice (and, in this case, an opportunity to object) of the Plaintiffs intention to 
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name them as substituted parties. Simply put, neither the deceased Defendant nor 
his heirs at law are prejudiced in any fashion by the Plaintiffs decision not to serve 
them with any notice of hearing until after a hearing was actually scheduled. It is 
clear that, once the hearing is scheduled, notice of the hearing will be served on the 
heirs in the same manner as prescribed by Rule 25. Under these circumstances, it 
is respectfully submitted that it was reversible error for the District Court to 
dismiss the case on this basis. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
IN DETERMINING TO DISMISS 
THIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE. 
This Court has held that whether a case is properly dismissed with prejudice 
for failure to join a necessary party is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
See Ludlow v. Salt Lake County Bd. Of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 1101, 1104-1105 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Subsequently, in Donahue v. Smith, 27 P.3d 552 (Utah 
2001), the Utah Supreme Court held that the District Court in that case properly 
dismissed a case with prejudice for failure to comply with the timeliness 
requirements of Rule 25. In Donahue, unlike the present case, an automobile 
accident victim failed at any time to file his motion to substitute proper parties 
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under Rule 25, despite a notice of suggestion of death filed by the opposing party. 
Instead, the accident victim sought a belated extension of time within which to file 
such a motion. The Utah Supreme Court held that, under Utah R. Civ. P. 41, the 
lower court did not err in dismissing the case with prejudice, and that it would also 
not have been reversible error to dismiss the case without prejudice. Id. at 555 n.3. 
The Court's holding in Donahue was implicitly supportive of the Court of 
Appeals's holding in Ludlow that such rulings are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court did abuse its discretion in 
dismissing this case with prejudice under the facts and circumstances herein. In 
Donahue, the accident victim took no actions at all to comply with Rule 25 until 
after the time period provided by that rule had already run. Here, the accident 
victim took steps to comply with the rule and filed his motion for substitution in a 
timely fashion. In Hartford Leasing Corporation v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court held that a determination whether to dismiss for 
failure to prosecute required the Court to balance the need to expedite litigation 
and efficiently use judicial resources with the need to allow parties to have their 
day in court. Such a determination requires the Court to consider the totality of the 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. In particular, the Court considers (1) the 
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conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity available to each party to move the 
case forward; (3) what each party has accomplished in moving the case forward; 
(4) the difficulty or prejudice imposed on the opposing party by reason of the 
delay; and (5) most importantly, whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
Mat 697-698. 
In the instant case, short of shouldering the burden of finding an appropriate 
personal representative for the deceased Defendant, the Plaintiff did everything 
possible to bring the proper parties before the Court so that the underlying merits 
of the dispute could be presented. He arranged for personal service upon the 
decedent's heirs with his motion to substitute them as parties; and he timely filed 
his motion to do so with the Court. The Defendant, however, made no effort to 
advise the Plaintiff of who should properly be appointed as personal representative 
of the estate to allow the case to proceed. Under these circumstances, and 
particularly in light of the harsh result — which would deny the plaintiff any right 
to be heard on the merits of his tort claim — it is respectfully submitted that the 
District Court abused its discretion in determining to dismiss this case with 
prejudice. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court should be reversed and this case 
should be remanded for trial on the merits of the Plaintiffs claims. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2002. 
^•>^cl iV^^ 
James C. Haskins ~/^-
Attorney for Plaintiff 
kU t 
iomas N. Thompso1 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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